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I. INTRODUCTION 
Beginning with New Jersey in December 2010, more than a 
dozen states modified their statutes governing collective 
representation of public employees. The most visible nationally were 
Wisconsin, where the bill pushed by Governor Scott Walker and 
ultimately enacted produced the largest demonstrations in Madison 
since the Vietnam War and led to the recall of two Republican state 
senators and an effort to recall the governor,1 and Ohio, where the 
enactment that radically changed the state’s public employee 
collective bargaining statute was overwhelmingly rejected in a voter 
referendum.2 Receiving less national attention were changes in 
numerous other states that ranged from relatively minor tweaks to 
radical overhauls and outright repeal of collective bargaining rights. 
* Professor and Director, Institute for Law and the Workplace, IIT Chicago-Kent
College of Law. I gratefully acknowledge excellent research assistance from Amanda Clark, 
Chicago-Kent class of 2012, and financial support from the Marshall-Ewell Research Fund at 
Chicago-Kent. 
1. Scott Bauer, Union Anger Reflected in Lobbyist Report: The Four Groups That Spent
the Most in the First Half of 2011 Opposed Gov. Walker’s Agenda, WIS. STATE J., Sept. 16, 2011, 
at A3. 
2. Editorial, Humble Pie, 32 CRAIN’S CLEV. BUS., Nov. 14, 2011, at 10.
534 EMPLOYEE RIGHTS AND EMPLOYMENT POLICY JOURNAL [Vol. 16:533 
Fueling this tsunami of legislative reform was the view that 
public employee collective bargaining is bad for the public.3 Under 
this view, unions exercising outsized power have been able to use a 
privileged position of exclusive access to decision makers to extract 
excessive wages and benefits, protect employees who are mediocre or 
worse performers, stifle incentives to excel, and stifle innovation. 
Joseph Slater’s path-breaking work on the history of public 
sector collective bargaining has shown how the law has channeled 
public sector unions, often not for the better. For example, he has 
shown how courts through the early 1960s, in upholding public 
employer prohibitions of union membership, ignored union 
structures, bylaws, and intended purposes, and instead attributed to 
them all of the attributes of private sector unions, seeking to engage 
in traditional collective bargaining backed by the threat and, when 
necessary, use of economic weapons.4 
Perhaps channeled by this judicial view, when states began 
enacting public employee collective bargaining statutes, they modeled 
them largely on the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). They 
changed the model as they believed appropriate for the public sector, 
most commonly with respect to the definition of bargaining units and 
the prohibition of work stoppages. But they adopted the basic NLRA 
approach to classifying subjects for collective bargaining. Under this 
all or nothing approach to worker voice in workplace decision-
making; if a subject is considered a mandatory subject of bargaining, 
duties to act in subjective good faith, to not bypass the exclusive 
representative and deal directly with employees, to provide the 
exclusive representative with relevant information, and the right to 
insist on a position to the point of impasse and resort to economic 
pressure attach. If the subject is not one of mandatory bargaining, it is 
subject to complete unilateral employer control. There is no 
requirement that employees be given a voice, and, if the employer 
wishes to give employees a voice, it may do so selectively and ignore 
3. For example, in a March 10, 2011, op. ed. in the Wall Street Journal, Wisconsin
Governor Walker attacked collective bargaining agreements for their wage rates, health 
insurance and pension provisions, and use of seniority. He compared public employee health 
and pension benefits to those of the private sector. He argued that his budget repair bill would 
give public employers “the tools to reward productive workers and improve their operations. 
Most crucially, our reforms confront the barriers of collective bargaining that currently block 
innovation and reform.” Scott Walker, Op.-Ed., Why I’m Fighting in Wisconsin, WALL. ST. J., 
Mar. 10, 2011, at A17. 
4.  See JOSEPH E. SLATER, PUBLIC WORKERS: GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, UNIONS, THE 
LAW AND THE STATE 1900-1962, at 71-95  (2004). 
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their exclusive representative. 
Regardless of the merits of this model in the private sector, it has 
many negative consequences in the public sector. In prior articles, I 
have shown how, out of concern that many subjects which in the 
private sector would clearly be mandatorily bargainable implicate 
important issues of public policy in the public sector, the scope of 
bargaining in the public sector has been narrowed considerably. 
Moreover, when such subjects are considered mandatorily 
bargainable, the emphasis is placed on their impact on employees’ 
economic interests rather than on employee interests in having a 
voice in improving the delivery of public services. For example, the 
majority view is that class size is not a mandatory subject of 
bargaining because it raises issues of educational policy, but those 
jurisdictions that require bargaining over class size do so to give 
teachers a voice in determining their workload rather than as a means 
for giving teachers a voice in the impact of class size on the quality of 
instruction.5 
When worker voice is channeled so narrowly, it is not surprising 
that workers’ representatives exert the full force of their bargaining 
power in those narrow areas. For example, in Wisconsin in the 1990s, 
the legislature enacted the qualified economic offer (QEO) which 
essentially ended bargaining over teacher salaries as long as the 
employer made an offer in accordance with a statutorily prescribed 
formula.6 The effect was to channel teacher unions into negotiating 
benefits which were not subject to the QEO and it is not surprising 
that they did so successfully.7 Nor is it surprising that unions will act 
to stifle innovations when they have been excluded from having a 
voice in the formulation of such innovations. 
Experience indicates, however, that when, in spite of the legal 
doctrine, workers are given a voice in issues concerning the quality of 
public services, they respond very positively. For example, when 
teacher evaluation standards are developed and implemented 
unilaterally by management, we should not be surprised to see 
5.  See Martin H. Malin, The Paradox in Public Sector Labor Law, 84 IND. L.J. 1369
(2009); Martin H. Malin & Charles Taylor Kerchner, Charter Schools and Collective Bargaining: 
Compatible Marriage or Illegitimate Relationship?, 30 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 885 (2007). 
6.  Wis. Act 16, 1993 Wis. Sess. Laws 26 (codified at WIS. STAT. § 111.70(1) (2010)). In
2009, Wisconsin repealed the QEO in Wis. Act 28, 2009 Wis. Sess. Laws 179 (Assemb. 75, 2009-
10 Leg. (Wis. 2009)). The text of the Act is available at <https://docs.legis.wisconsin. 
gov/2009/related/acts/28.pdf>. 
7.  I acknowledge Bruce Meredith, former general counsel of the Wisconsin Education
Association Council, for this point. 
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teacher unions employ all methods at their disposal to protect their 
members from attack under the unilaterally imposed regime. 
However when, in spite of the law, school districts and teachers 
collaborate on developing and implementing evaluation standards 
through peer review processes, teacher unions tend to be transformed 
from defenders of the irremediably incompetent to protectors of 
professional standards.8 
In my prior work, I have related numerous examples of the 
positive impact of worker voice in the public sector enterprise that 
occurred in spite of rather than because of the law.9 Other scholars 
have pointed to additional examples.10 Many employers have 
recognized the benefits of involving employees through their 
exclusive bargaining representatives in the decision-making process. 
For example, during the debates over the Wisconsin Budget Repair 
Bill, the Wisconsin Association of School Boards reported that many 
of its members were “gravely concerned” that the bill would 
“immeasurably harm the collaborative relationships that exist 
between school boards and teachers.”11 And hundreds of local 
government officials in Wisconsin signed an open letter to the 
governor opposing the bill on similar grounds.12 
A particularly striking example of management recognition of 
the benefits of organized worker voice comes from the federal 
government. On October 1, 1993, President Clinton issued Executive 
Order 12,871, which, among other things, established the National 
Partnership Council and called for the creation of labor-management 
partnerships throughout the Executive Branch. The goal of such 
partnerships was to “champion change in Federal government 
agencies to transform them into organizations capable of delivering 
the highest quality services to the American people.”13 The 
8.  See Malin & Kerchner, supra note 5, at 904-06.
9. See Malin, supra, note 5, at 1392-96; Malin & Kerchner, supra note 5, at 903-11.
10. See, e.g., DAVID LEWIN ET AL., EMP’T POLICY RESEARCH NETWORK & LABOR AND
EMP’T RELATIONS ASS’N, GETTING IT RIGHT: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE AND POLICY 
IMPLICATIONS FROM RESEARCH ON PUBLIC-SECTOR UNIONISM AND COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING 16-22 (2011), available at <http://www.employmentpolicy.org/sites/www.em 
ploymentpolicy.org/files/EPRN%20PS%20draft%203%2016%2011%20PM%20FINALtk-ml4 
%20edits.pdf>. 
11. Letter from John H. Ashley, Executive Director, Wis. Ass’n of Sch. Bds. to Hon.
Alberta Darling & Hon. Robin Vos, Co-chairs, Wis. Legislature Joint Comm. on Fin. (Feb. 15, 
2011) (copy on file with author). 
12. See Erin Richards et al., Clash Continues: Budget Battle: Day 12 Many City Officials
Think Union Limits Go Too Far, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Feb. 27, 2011, at B1, available at 
2011 WLNR 3854288. 
13. Exec. Order No. 12,871, 3 C.F.R. 655 (1993).
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partnerships established under the executive order produced 
numerous outcomes beneficial to the public.14 Nevertheless, in one of 
his first acts as president, President George W. Bush repealed the 
executive order.15 
There are many reasons why management desires employee 
involvement through exclusive representatives in workplace decision-
making. Studies find that the most productive workplaces are 
unionized workplaces with high levels of employee involvement.16 
Black and Lynch’s work simulated a base case of a non-union 
manufacturer with little employee involvement. They found that 
unionized firms with little employee involvement had productivity 
levels 15 percent lower than the base case. Non-unionized firms with 
high employee involvement had productivity levels 10.6 percent 
higher than the base case. But “adding unionization to this already 
high-performing workplace is associated with an impressive 20 
percent increase in labor productivity.”17 They then examined the 
actual mean characteristics of unionized and nonunionized firms in a 
sample of manufacturers. They found that the unionized firms 
averaged productivity 16 percent higher than the base case while the 
nonunionized firms’ productivity averaged 11 percent lower than the 
base case.18 
Why do unionized workplaces with high levels of employee 
involvement outperform all other types of workplaces? Black & 
Lynch attribute some of this to greater levels of job security in 
unionized workplaces.19 It seems intuitive that employees who need 
not fear job loss in retaliation for suggestions with which their 
superiors disagree will be more forthcoming with those suggestions. I 
suggest the advantages go beyond that, however. In unionized 
environments, management has a specific representative, one freely 
chosen by the employees, to turn to as a partner. Moreover, decisions 
resulting from such management-union partnerships are more likely 
to be perceived as legitimate by the workforce as a whole, thereby 
smoothing their implementation. 
14. See Malin, supra note 5, at 1395-96.
15. Exec. Order No. 13,203, 3 C.F.R. 761 (2001).
16. See LEWIN ET AL., supra note 10, at 22-26.
17. Sandra E. Black & Lisa M. Lynch, The New Workplace: What Does It Mean for
Productivity?, in INDUS. RELATIONS ASS’N, PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTIETH ANNUAL 
MEETING 60, 65 (Paula B. Voos ed. 1998). 
18. Id. 
19. Id. 
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In his Wall Street Journal op. ed., Wisconsin Governor Walker 
maintained that the legislative reform in Wisconsin would “confront 
the barriers of collective bargaining that currently block innovation 
and reform.”20 I submit that, to the extent that barriers to innovation 
and reform exist, they stem from the NLRA model that mandates 
that matters are subject either to traditional collective bargaining or 
left to complete unilateral employer control. Meaningful reform must 
look for vehicles to expand worker voice in positive ways by looking 
at models outside the traditional NLRA approach to all or nothing 
collective bargaining. 
In this article, I evaluate the legislative “reforms” enacted in the 
current tsunami against this goal. Part II examines the changes in the 
various states to their public sector labor relations regimes and finds 
that generally, rather than provide reforms which will improve the 
delivery of public services, the tsunami that hit the public sector 
workplace only enhanced unilateral employer control. Part III 
concludes that these reforms are doomed to failure and will serve to 
further inhibit innovations by increasing legal barriers beyond those 
that the traditional collective bargaining regime posed. Part IV 
examines reforms in two states, Indiana and Tennessee, that on their 
face appear promising. However, as Part IV demonstrates, those 
appearances are deceiving and the reforms are illusory. Part V finds a 
few glimmers of hope in recent developments and suggests ways that 
might lead to meaningful reform through redirected employee voice 
in the public sector workplace. 
II. THE TSUNAMI21
In this part, I review the changes enacted in twelve states: Idaho, 
Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska, Nevada, New 
Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennessee, and Wisconsin. The Ohio 
legislation was overturned by voters in a referendum in November 
2011 and, therefore, never went into effect. The Idaho legislation was 
rejected by voters in a referendum in November 2012. However, they 
are included because they fit within the overall tone of the tsunami 
that hit public sector labor law in the past year two years. 
The numerous state enactments share a common characteristic. 
They replace collective representation with unilateral employer 
20. Walker, supra note 3.
21. This Part draws on my article, The Upheaval in Public Sector Labor Law: A Search for
Common Elements, 27 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 149(2012). 
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control. They do so by eliminating collective bargaining rights, 
restricting the scope of bargaining and, where bargaining is allowed, 
changing impasse procedures to strengthen employer control, and in 
the case of interest arbitration, to strengthen legislative control over 
the process. Finally, they facilitate the abrogation of collective 
bargaining agreements during times of fiscal distress. Rather than 
proceed state-by-state, I will highlight these characteristics and 
explain which states’ enactments exhibit them. 
A. Eliminating Collective Bargaining Rights 
Two states, Oklahoma and Tennessee, repealed statutes that 
provided public employees with collective bargaining rights. On April 
29, 2011, Oklahoma Governor Mary Fallin signed House Bill 1593 
repealing the Oklahoma Municipal Employee Collective Bargaining 
Act, which had guaranteed the rights to organize and bargain 
collectively to employees of municipalities with populations above 
35,000.22 The repeal leaves the decision to bargain to the 
municipalities’ discretion. The repeal’s sponsors argued that it was 
necessary to restore local control over the decision to bargain 
collectively.23 The governor maintained that it would control costs.24 
Tennessee repealed the Education Professional Negotiations 
Act, which had provided teachers with the right to organize and 
bargain collectively since 1978, and replaced it with the Professional 
Educators Collaborative Conferencing Act of 2011.25 The Tennessee 
Senate had voted to repeal the collective bargaining law but the state 
House of Representatives had voted to limit the scope of bargaining 
rather than repeal it.26 The following day, a conference committee 
22.  Okla. H.R. 1593, 53d Leg., 2d Sess. (Okla. 2011); see Bill Information for HB 1593
(2011-2012), OKLA. STATE LEGISLATURE, <http://www.oklegislature.gov/BillInfo.aspx?Bill= 
hb1593&Session=1100> (last viewed Dec. 3, 2012). 
23.  See Barbara Hoberock, Oklahoma Gov. Fallin Signs Bill to End Collective Bargaining,
TULSA WORLD, Apr. 29, 2011, at A8 (quoting Representative Steve Martin); Sean Murphy, 
Oklahoma Senate Approves Anti-Union Rights Bill, TULSA WORLD (last modified Apr. 19, 
2011, 2:24 PM), <http://www.tulsaworld.com/news/article.aspx?subjectid=336&articleid=2011 
0419_336_0_OKLAHO385498> (quoting Senator Cliff Aldridge). 
24.  Hoberock, supra note 23. Interestingly, the Oklahoma House defeated another bill,
House Bill 1576, which would have amended Oklahoma’s police and firefighter collective 
bargaining statute by giving municipalities the option of accepting the award of an interest 
arbitrator or rejecting it and returning to negotiations. Bill Information for HB 1576 (2011-
2012), OKLA. STATE LEGISLATURE, <http://www.oklegislature.gov/BillInfo.aspx?Bill=hb1576 
&Session=1100> (last viewed Dec. 3, 2012). 
25.  2011 Tenn. Pub. Acts 378 (codified at TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-5-601 (2011)).
26.  See Richard Locker, Teacher Collective Bargaining Bill Hinges on GOP, MEMPHIS
COM. APPEAL (updated May 19, 2011, 11:30 PM), <http://www.commercialappeal.com/ 
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voted for the repeal which passed later that day in both houses.27 The 
details of the Collaborative Conferencing Act are discussed in Part 
III. 
Several states, while not repealing their public employee 
collective bargaining statutes, amended them to deny collective 
bargaining rights to certain groups of employees. Nevada took 
bargaining rights away from doctors, lawyers, and some supervisors.28 
Had it not been rejected by voters, the Ohio enactment would have 
taken bargaining rights away from university faculty who participate 
in faculty governance and certain police and firefighter supervisors.29 
The Wisconsin statute took away collective bargaining rights 
from state university faculty, all employees of the UW Hospitals and 
Clinics, and day care and home health care providers.30 Although the 
act did not repeal the Municipal Employee Relations Act or the State 
Employee Relations Act, it effectively abolished collective bargaining 
for all public employees except for many law enforcement and fire 
protection personnel by prohibiting bargaining on any subject other 
than “base wages,” which the act expressly provides excludes 
overtime, premium pay, merit pay, performance pay, supplemental 
pay, and pay progressions.31 Furthermore, base wages may not 
increase more than the increase in the consumer price index (CPI) as 
of 180 days before the expiration of the collective bargaining 
agreement unless higher base wages are approved in a public 
referendum.32 In many respects, employees in Oklahoma have more 
protection for collective bargaining than employees in Wisconsin. 
Although Oklahoma repealed its statute that mandated collective 
bargaining rights in mid-sized municipalities, it allows collective 
bargaining at the option of the employer. Wisconsin prohibits 
news/2011/may/19/tennessee-house-votes-limit-collective-bargaining/>. 
27.  See Richard Locker, Tennessee Legislature OKs Ban of Teacher Bargaining, MEMPHIS 
COM. APPEAL (updated May 21, 2011, 7:40 AM), <http://www.commercialappeal.com 
/news/2011/may/20/new-version-bill-repeals-collective-bargaining-tea/>. Critics of the repeal 
charged that it was Republican retaliation against the Tennessee Education Association for 
supporting more Democrats than Republicans in the 2010 elections, noting that Representative 
Glen Casada, chair of the Republican caucus had asked the union prior to the elections to 
increase its campaign contributions to Republicans to equal what it was giving to Democrats. 
Locker, supra note 26. 
28.  S. 98, §§ 5, 6, 76th Sess. (Nev. 2011) (codified at NEV. REV. STAT. § 288.140 (2011)).
29.  S. 5, 29th Gen. Assemb. (Ohio 2011) (amending OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§
4117.01(K), (C)(10), (F)(2)). 
30.  2011 Wis. Act 10 §§ 265 (state university faculty), 279 (UW Hospitals and clinics), 280
(day and home healthcare providers). 
31.  Id. §314.
32.  Id.
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collective bargaining even if the employer is willing to engage in it.33 It 
is not surprising that the Wisconsin act repealed the declarations in 
the Municipal and State Employee Relations Acts which had found 
public employee collective bargaining to be in the public interest.34 
B. Limiting the Scope of Bargaining 
By far, the most numerous changes made in the tsunami of 2011 
concerned the scope of bargaining. Numerous state legislatures have 
removed, and in many cases prohibited, bargaining over a wide range 
of subjects. Some subjects removed from the bargaining table are 
directly related to compensation, while others deal with working 
conditions. Regardless, the legislatures are giving public sector 
employers the tools of command, control, and unilateral imposition. 
The item of compensation most frequently removed from the 
bargaining table has been health care. Although most law 
enforcement and fire protection personnel were exempted from the 
Wisconsin budget repair act’s prohibition on bargaining anything 
other than base wages, the state’s regular biannual budget act 
prohibited bargaining over law enforcement and firefighter health 
insurance.35 Ohio’s enactment deemed “not appropriate” for 
bargaining inter alia health care benefits, except that the parties may 
agree that the employer will pay up to 85 percent of the premiums.36 
New Jersey suspended bargaining over health care benefits for 
four years while a new statute is phased in. The statute sets a sliding 
scale according to salary of mandatory employee contributions to 
health care premiums and provides for health care plans to be 
designed by two state committees, one for education and one for rest 
of public sector.37 
Massachusetts enacted a new method for local governments to 
make changes in health insurance. The governing body may adopt 
changes along with estimated cost savings and proof of the savings. It 
gives notice to each bargaining unit and a retiree representative. The 
retiree representative and the bargaining unit representatives form a 
public employee committee which negotiates with the employer for 
33.  Id. § 169.
34.  Id. § 261.
35.  2011 Wis. Act 32 § 2409.
36.  S. 5, 29th Gen. Assemb. (Ohio 2011) (amending OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§
4117.08(B)(2), (E)). 
37.  2011 N. J. Laws 78.
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up to thirty days. After thirty days, the matter is submitted to a tri-
partite committee which, within ten days, can approve the employer’s 
proposed changes, reject them, or remand for additional information. 
The committee’s decision is final.38 
Idaho limited negotiations for teachers to “compensation,” which 
it defined as salary and benefits, including insurance, leave time, and 
sick leave.39 Previously, the subjects of negotiations were specified in a 
negotiations agreement between the parties. The Idaho enactment 
also limited collective bargaining agreements to one fiscal year, July 1 
through June 30, and prohibited evergreen clauses or other provisions 
to the effect that an agreement continues until a new agreement is 
reached.40 In November 2012, voters rejected the Idaho enactment by 
a vote of 57.1 perecnt to 42.7 percent.41 
Similar to Idaho, Indiana limited collective bargaining for 
teachers to wages and salary and wage related fringe benefits 
including insurance, retirement benefits, and paid time off.42 The 
statute permits collective bargaining agreements to have grievance 
procedures, but strikes the prior law’s express authorization for the 
grievance procedure to culminate in binding arbitration.43 The new 
statute prohibits bargaining on everything else, including express 
prohibitions on bargaining school calendar, teacher dismissal 
procedures and criteria, restructuring options, contracting with an 
educational entity that provides post-secondary credits to students, 
and teacher evaluation procedures and criteria.44 It also prohibits any 
contract that would place a school district in a deficit45 and prohibits 
collective bargaining agreements from extending beyond the end of 
the state budget biennium.46 The new law repeals a prior provision 
38.  2011 Mass. Acts 69 (approved July 12, 2011). Media reports suggested that in April
when the Massachusetts House passed more restrictive legislation, President Obama’s director 
of intergovernmental affairs telephoned Massachusetts Governor Deval Patrick. The governor 
negotiated changes with labor leaders whose attitude changed from a vow to fight the legislation 
“to the bitter end” to support and congratulations to the governor for “listening to labor’s 
concerns.” See Michael Levenson, National Scrutiny for Mass. Labor Law, BOSTON GLOBE, 
July 12, 2011, Metro, at 1. 
39. S. 1108 § 17, 61st Leg. (Idaho 2011). 
40. Id. § 22.
41. Idaho Sec’y of State, Election Div., Nov. 6, 2012 General Election Results, Proposition
1,  <http://sos.idaho.gov/elect/RESULTS/2012/General/tot_stwd.htm> (last viewed Dec. 28, 
2012.) 
42. 2011 Ind. Acts 575 §14.
43. Id. § 17.
44. Id. § 15.
45. Id. § 13.
46. Id. § 16.
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that authorized parties to agree to arbitrate teacher dismissals.47 
In addition to health care benefits, the Ohio enactment deemed 
the following inappropriate for collective bargaining: provisions 
restricting contracting out or providing severance pay to employees 
whose jobs are contracted out; provisions that grant more than six 
weeks of vacation, more than twelve holidays, or more than three 
personal days; payment of employee contributions to retirement 
systems; minimum staffing provisions; and restrictions on school 
district authority to assign personnel, class size, reductions in force of 
educational employees, and the use of seniority as the sole factor in 
reductions in force.48 
Michigan added to an already lengthy list of prohibited subjects 
of bargaining for educational personnel. Decision and impact 
bargaining are now prohibited with respect to: placement of teachers; 
reductions in force and recalls; performance evaluation systems; the 
development, content, standards, procedures, adoption, and 
implementation of a policy regarding employee discharge or 
discipline; the format, timing, and number of classroom visits; the 
development, content, standards, procedures, adoption, and 
implementation of the method of employee compensation and 
decisions about how an employee performance evaluation is used to 
determine performance-based compensation; and the development, 
format, content, and procedures of notice to parents and legal 
guardians of pupils taught by a teacher who has been rated as 
ineffective.49 
Illinois amended its Educational Labor Relations Act to provide 
that in the Chicago Public Schools, the length of the school day and 
the length of the school year are permissive, rather than mandatory, 
subjects of bargaining.50 The amendment responded to calls from the 
Mayor of Chicago to authorize his appointed school board and 
management team to increase the school day unilaterally in light of 
the Chicago Teachers Union’s failure in the past to agree to such 
47. Id. § 6.
48. S. 5, 29th Gen. Assemb. (Ohio 2011) (amending OHIO REV. STAT. ANN. §§
4117.08(B)(4) (contracting out), 4117.105(B)(contracting out), 4117.108(A)(1) (vacation), 
4117.108(A)(2)-(3) (holiday & personal time), 4771.08(B)(3), 4117.08(B)(5) (staffing), 
4117.081(B)(1) (school district authority to assign), 4117.081(B)(3) (class size), 4117.081(B)(4) 
(RIF-educational employees), 306.04(B) (seniority-transit), 709.012 (seniority-firefighters), 
3316.07(A)(11) (seniority-teachers)). 
49. 2011 Mich. Pub. Acts 103.
50. S. 7 § 10, 97th Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2011).
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increases.51 
C. Advantaging the Employer in Impasse Resolution 
It seems intuitive that the type of impasse resolution procedure a 
state adopts will have a significant effect on collective negotiations.52 
The most extreme approach, and the one which gives the employer 
the most power, leaves terms and conditions of employment up to the 
employer if negotiations do not lead to agreement. This approach, 
often decried by labor as “collective begging” rather than collective 
bargaining was adopted in the Idaho enactment that voters 
overturned. The Idaho legislation repealed the prior requirement of 
factfinding.53 Under the Idaho enactment, the parties were authorized 
but not required to enter mediation if they had not reached 
agreement by May 10.54 If they did not reach agreement by June 10, 
the school board was required to unilaterally set the terms and 
conditions of employment for the coming school year by June 22.55 
The statute did not expressly restrict the school board’s actions, 
thereby leaving open the possibility that the school board could have 
established terms never offered to the union. With evergreen clauses 
prohibited, Idaho school boards may have been tempted to surface 
bargain, run out the clock, and unilaterally set terms.56  
Wisconsin prohibited interest arbitration for all employees 
except most law enforcement and firefighters.57 Wisconsin now has no 
impasse procedures for most public employees. Of course, with 
bargaining limited to base wages and further effectively limited to the 
change in the CPI, there may not be much need for impasse 
resolution. 
51. See Noreen S. Ahmed-Ullah & Kristen Mack, Emmanuel Sees Longer School Days,
CHI. TRIB., Apr. 16, 2011, at 6. 
52. But see Thomas Kochan et al., The Long Haul Effects of Interest Arbitration: The Case
of New York State’s Taylor Law, 63 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 565 (2010) (finding no significant 
differences on wage rate outcomes when negotiated under interest arbitration or non-binding 
factfinding regimes). 
53. S. 1108 § 22, 61st Leg. (Idaho 2011). 
54. Id. § 20.
55. Id. 
56. Interestingly, the Idaho Supreme Court has held that teacher strikes are not
automatically enjoinable but are subject to a defense of school board unclean hands due to bad 
faith in the negotiations process. Sch. Dist. No. 351 Oneida Cnty. v. Oneida Educ. Ass’n, 567 
P.2d 830 (Idaho 1977). The court assumed, but did not decide, that teacher strikes were illegal, 
and one concurring justice opined that teacher strikes were lawful, there being no express 
statute prohibiting them. Id. at 836 (Bakes, J., concurring the judgment and dissenting in part). 
57. 2011 Wis. Act 10 §234.
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Since 1984, Ohio has recognized a right to strike for most public 
employees and a right to interest arbitration for the others. Ohio 
voters rejected the legislative enactment which would have prohibited 
strikes by all public employees and enforced the prohibition with 
fines for strikers of two days’ pay for each day on strike, discipline or 
discharge of strikers, loss of dues checkoff for striking unions, and 
strike injunctions.58 The Ohio enactment also would have prohibited 
interest arbitration. 
In place of strikes and interest arbitration, the Ohio enactment 
mandated factfinding if no agreement was reached forty-five days 
before the scheduled expiration of an existing contract. The statute 
required that the factfinder’s primary consideration be the public 
interest and welfare and the employer’s ability to pay, and limited the 
factfinder to considering the employer’s financial status as of time 
period surrounding negotiations, precluding consideration of 
potential increases in employer revenue or employer ability to sell 
assets. The enactment allowed either party by majority vote within 
fifteen days following the factfinder’s recommendations to reject 
them, leading to the State Employment Relations Board publicizing 
the recommendations. Absent agreement reached within five days 
after publication, the parties were to submit their last best offers to 
the employer’s legislative body which was to have its chief financial 
officer certify which offer cost more and hold a public hearing. Within 
fifteen days following contract expiration, the legislative body was to 
pick one party’s final offer, with the employer’s offer governing if no 
selection was made.59 
States that did not prohibit interest arbitration severely restricted 
arbitrator discretion. New Jersey amended its police and firefighter 
interest arbitration provisions to eliminate party selection of the 
arbitrator; the arbitrator is randomly selected by the Public 
Employment Relations Commission from a special PERC panel; the 
award must issue within forty-five days of arbitrator appointment 
(prior law allowed 120 days). The parties must present written 
estimates of the financial impact of their final offers. The award must 
address all statutory criteria and certify that the arbitrator took 
statutory limitations imposed by a local levy cap into account. The 
award may be appealed to PERC which must decide the appeal 
58. S. 5, 29th Gen. Assemb. (Ohio 2011) (amending OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
4117.12(B)(4)). 
59. Id. (amending OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §4117.14 (D)(2)).
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within thirty days, must address all statutory factors and must certify 
that it took the levy cap into account. The statute caps arbitrator fees 
at $1000 per day and $7500 total, and caps cancellation fees at $500; it 
fines arbitrators $1000 per day for being late. The award may not 
increase base salary items by more than 2 percent of the aggregate 
amount expended by the employer in the twelve months immediately 
preceding expiration of the prior contract and may not include base 
salary items and other economic issues that were not included in the 
prior contract. The cap on base salaries sunsets on April 1, 2014.60 
In Nebraska, interest arbitration is performed by the 
Commission of Industrial Relations (CIR), whose members are 
appointed by the governor. The new Nebraska act provides detailed 
criteria for selecting an array of comparable communities, specifies 
how many comparable communities must be selected, and mandates 
that if the employer at issue pays compensation that is between 98 
percent and 102 percent of the average of the comparables, including 
fringe benefits, then the CIR must leave compensation as it is. If the 
employer’s compensation is below 98 percent of the average, the CIR 
is to order it raised to 98 percent and if it is above 102 percent, the 
CIR is to order it lowered to 102 percent. The targets are reduced to 
95 to 100 percent during periods of recession, defined as two 
consecutive quarters in which the state’s net sales and use taxes and 
individual and corporate income tax receipts are below those of the 
prior year.61 
Illinois tweaked its right to strike for most employees in public 
education and substantially restricted it for employees of the Chicago 
Public Schools. For school districts other than the Chicago Public 
Schools (CPS), if there is no agreement within forty-five days of the 
start of the school year, the Illinois Educational Labor Relations 
Board must invoke mediation. After fifteen days of mediation, either 
party may declare impasse. Seven days later, each party submits its 
final offer and cost summary. Seven days thereafter, the final offers 
are made public. No strike is allowed until at least fourteen days after 
publication of final offers.62 
For the Chicago Public Schools, if no agreement is reached after 
a reasonable period of mediation, the dispute is submitted to 
factfinding upon demand of either party. Factfinding is tri-partite 
60. 2010 N.J.Laws 1204.
61. Leg. 397, 102d Leg., 1st Sess. (Neb. 2011).
62. S. 7 §13(b)(2), 97th Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2011). 
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unless the parties agree otherwise. If there is no settlement within 
seventy-five days, the factfinder issues a private report with 
recommendations, which the parties have fifteen days to reject. If 
rejected, the recommendations are made public. There may be no 
strike for thirty days following publication and no strike unless 
authorized by 75 percent of union membership.63 
D. Abrogating Contracts in Times of Fiscal Distress 
In National Treasury Employees Union v. Chertoff,64 the D.C. 
Circuit, in an opinion written by Chief Judge Harry Edwards, 
invalidated regulations of the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) because they were inconsistent with the Homeland Security 
Act’s requirement that DHS’s personnel system ensure that 
employees may bargain collectively. Among other grounds for the 
invalidation was the regulations’ provision allowing management to 
abrogate collective bargaining agreements. The court quoted with 
approval the district court’s observation that the “sine qua non of 
good faith collective bargaining is an enforceable contract once the 
parties reach an agreement,”65 and its analysis that “[a] contract that is 
not mutually binding is not a contract. Negotiations that lead to a 
contract that is not mutually binding are not true negotiations. A 
system of ‘collective bargaining’ that permits the unilateral 
repudiation of agreements by one party is not collective bargaining at 
all.”66 
The tsunami of 2011 that hit the states looks toward the 
abrogation of collective bargaining agreements in times of fiscal 
distress. Nevada required contracts to provide for reopening in times 
of fiscal emergency.67 The voter-rejected Ohio enactment provided for 
modification or termination of contracts if the state placed a local 
government on fiscal watch or fiscal emergency.68 The most far 
reaching enactment was the Michigan Local Government and School 
District Fiscal Accountability Act of 2011.69 It specified procedures 
63. Id. §13(b)(2.10).
64. 452 F.3d 839 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
65. Id. at 851.
66. Id. 
67. S. 98 §7(2)(w), 76th Reg. Sess. (Nev. 2011). 
68. S. 5, 29th Gen. Assemb. (Ohio 2011) (amending OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
4117.104(A)). 
69. 2011 Mich. Pub. Acts 4 (2011). The law was rejected by referendum in the November
2012 election. See Nancy Kaffer, Voters Reject Attacks on Constitution, DETROIT FREE PRESS, 
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that could lead to a finding by the state of financial emergency. Upon 
such a finding, the governor would have appointed an emergency 
manager who, among other things, would have the power to reject all 
or part of a collective bargaining agreement upon finding that the 
financial emergency created a circumstance where it was reasonable 
and necessary for the state to intervene, the rejection was reasonable 
and necessary to deal with a broad, generalized economic problem, 
rejection was directly related to and designed to address the financial 
emergency, and rejection was temporary and did not target specific 
classes of employees. 
A potentially very significant development concerning the 
integrity of collective bargaining agreements will likely come from the 
Illinois courts. AFSCME and the State of Illinois entered into a 
collective bargaining agreement effective September 5, 2008 through 
June 30, 2012. The contract provided for raises totaling 15.25 percent 
over the life of the agreement.70 In response to the Great Recession, 
the union agreed to concessions that saved the state approximately, 
$400,000,000.00. These concessions included agreement to defer a 4 
percent wage increase that was to take effect July 1, 2011, to 2 percent 
effective effective July 1, 2011 and 2 percent effective February 1, 
2012. The state also agreed not to lay off any bargaining unit 
employees through the end of the 2012 fiscal year.71 
As the July 1, 2011 raise approached, the state sought additional 
concessions but the union refused. The state then refused to put the 2 
percent wage increase into effect, and the union grieved. An 
arbitrator sustained the union’s grievance and awarded that the state 
pay the 2 percent wage increase.72 Subsequently, the state announced 
layoffs. The union grieved, and the matter proceeded before the same 
arbitrator who issued an award prohibiting the layoffs because they 
Nov. 7, 2012, at 1. However, the lame duck legislature reenacted it and included in the 
enactment an appropiation provision, intended to prevent another referendum. 2012 Mich. Pub. 
Acts 436 (2012); see Chad Livengood & Shaun D. Lewis, New EM Law Could be Used to 
Appoint a Financial Czar in Detroit, DETROIT NEWS, Dec. 28, 2012, at <http://www. 
detroitnews.com/article/20121228/POLITICS02/212280373>. 
70. See AFSCME Council 31 and State of Illinois Contract Changes 22-23 (Sept. 5, 2008-
June 30, 2012), available at <http://www2.illinois.gov/cms/employees/personnel/documents/ 
emp_afscme08chg.pdf> 
71. See State of Illinois & AFSCME Council 31, Arb. Ref. 10.251 2011-2012 Layoffs and
Facility Closures, at 3 (October 3, 2011) (Edwin H. Benn, Arb.), available at <http://www.state. 
il.us/ilrb/subsections/pdfs/ArbitrationAwards/State%20of%20Illinois%20&%20AFSCME,%20 
Layoffs%20&%20Facility%20Closures.pdf>. 
72. State of Illinois & AFSCME Council 31, Arb. Ref. 10.251 July 1, 2011 Increases (July
19, 2011) (Edwin H. Benn, Arb.), available at <http://www.state.il.us/ilrb/subsections/ 
pdfs/ArbitrationAwards/State%20of%20Illinois%20&%20AFSCME,20pay%20raises.pdf>. 
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violated the state’s agreement not to lay off bargaining unit 
employees in exchange for economic concessions.73 
The state has sued to vacate both awards. The state argues that 
section 21 of the Illinois Public Employment Relations Act, which 
authorizes multi-year collective bargaining agreements “[s]ubject to 
the appropriation power of the employer,”74 precludes enforcement of 
the award because the state legislature failed to appropriate sufficient 
funds to fund the wage increases or the no-layoff commitment. The 
state also argues that enforcement of the awards would violate the 
Illinois Constitution which, it contends, prohibits the executive 
branch from expending funds that the legislature has failed to 
appropriate. The Circuit Court of Cook County ordered the state to 
pay the raises to the extent it has appropriated funds and to pay the 
balance plus interest at a later date.75 The state has appealed. If the 
state is successful, Illinois public employers will have the power to 
abrogate the economic provisions of multi-year collective bargaining 
agreements by refusing to appropriate funds needed to comply. 
III. THE TSUNAMI’S WRECKAGE
The tsunami of 2011 has swept in new regimes in many states 
that allow for unilateral, top-down employer control over employees’ 
work lives.76 We have seen this before, and the picture was not pretty. 
On October 1, 1993, President Clinton issued Executive Order 
12,871, which, among other things, established a National Partnership 
Council and required the establishment of labor-management 
partnerships throughout the executive branch. Among the many 
successful labor-management partnerships was one between the 
National Treasury Employees Union (NTEU) and the U.S. Customs 
Service. That partnership designed a seven-step strategy to increase 
seizures of illegal drugs which, during its six month life, resulted in a 
42 percent increase in narcotics seizures and a 74 percent increase in 
73. State of Illinois & AFSCME Council 31, Arb. Ref. 10.251 2011-2012 Layoffs and
Facility Closures, supra note 71. 
74. 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 315/21 (2010).
75.  Doug Finke, Judge Orders Quinn to Honor State Employee Raises, ST. J. REGISTER,
Dec. 7, 2012, at <http://www.sj-r.com/breaking/x1665846618/Judge-orders-Quinn-to-honor-state-
employee-contract-raises>. 
76. Early results in Wisconsin indicated a mixed bag with some employers unilaterally
changing working conditions while others work cooperatively with employees’ representatives. 
See Steven Verburg, New Work Rules Set in as Contracts Lapse, WIS. STATE J., Dec. 25, 2011, at 
A1, available at <http://host.madison.com/wsj/news/local/govtandpolitics/newworkrulessetin 
ascontractslapse/article_da55410c bb86 55a6 8ffa 71bb933fe4be.html?mode=story>. 
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currency seizures.77 Following the election of President George W. 
Bush, the Heritage Foundation urged him to rescind Executive Order 
12,871 because it impeded the type of top-down control thought 
necessary to implement the administration’s policy agenda.78 
President Bush appeared to listen. During his first month in office, he 
revoked the Clinton executive order and directed heads of all 
executive agencies to “[p]romptly move to rescind any orders, rules, 
regulations, guidelines, or policies implementing or enforcing 
Executive Order 12,871 . . .”79 Adopting the model of unilateral, top-
down control, the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, the 
successor agency to the Customs Service, among other things, 
imposed a rule prohibiting CBP agents from having facial hair. This 
led to a lengthy battle with NTEU in which NTEU successfully 
fought the new rule.80 Which is the better use of the time of unions 
and public managers: cooperatively devising improvements in the 
interdiction of illegal narcotics and currency or fighting over whether 
the agent who greets persons entering the country may have a beard 
or mustache? 
As discussed earlier, experience suggests that the most efficient, 
productive environments are those in which organized employees are 
highly involved in workplace decision-making. Despite Governor 
Walker’s belief that top-down unilateral control will lead to better 
government, the likelihood is that improvements in workplace 
efficiency, productivity, and public service, if they occur at all, will do 
so in spite of, rather than because of, the tsunami. 
IV. ILLUSIONS OF HOPE: INDIANA AND TENNESSEE
As we sift through the tsunami’s wreckage, enactments from 
Indiana and Tennessee appear to shine as potential diamonds in the 
rough. Closer examination, however, reveals that the diamonds are 
fake and any hope they may offer as a path to constructive employee 
involvement in workplace decision-making that leads to improved 
77. U.S. OFFICE OF PERS. MGMT., LABOR-MANAGEMENT PARTNERSHIP: A REPORT TO
THE PRESIDENT § III (2000). 
78. GEORGE NESTERCZUK ET AL., THE HERITAGE FOUND., TAKING CHARGE OF
FEDERAL PERSONNEL (2001). 
79. Exec. Order 13,203, 3 C.F.R. 761 (2001).
80. See Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. FLRA, 550 F.3d 1148 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Dep’t of
Homeland Sec., Customs & Border Protection & Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 10 FSIP 10 
(2011); Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Customs & Border Protection, 65 F.L.R.A. 98 (2010); Nat’l 
Treasury Emps. Union, 64 F.L.R.A. 395 (2010); Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Customs & Border 
Protection, 62 F.L.R.A. 263 (2007); Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 62 F.L.R.A. 267 (2007). 
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public service is illusory. 
As discussed above, Indiana severely restricted the scope of 
bargaining for its public school teachers. But buried in the statute is a 
provision that the parties shall discuss curriculum development and 
revision, textbook selection, teaching methods, hiring, evaluation, 
promotion, demotion, transfer, assignment and retention, student 
discipline, expulsion or supervision of students, pupil/teacher ratio, 
class size or budget appropriations, safety issues, and hours.81 This 
provision suggests that Indiana might be requiring educational 
employers to involve their employees in constructive dialogue 
concerning the delivery of educational services. Hopes engendered by 
this suggestion are quickly crushed, however. The same section 
declares that any agreements reached in such discussions may not be 
included in the contract.82 The message to employees and their unions 
is, “Why bother? Anything that results from your discussions will not 
be enforceable.” 
Tennessee did not simply abolish collective bargaining for its 
public school teachers. It replaced it with what the new statute calls 
“collaborative conferencing.” Under the Collaborative Conferencing 
Act, between October 1 and November 1, employees may file with 
the school district a petition for collaborative conferencing supported 
by a 15 percent showing of interest.83 The school board must appoint a 
committee with equal representation of board members and 
employees to conduct an election whereby employees vote whether 
to engage in collaborative conferencing and, if so, who shall represent 
them. The choices for representation must include “unaffiliated.”84 If 
a majority vote for collaborative conferencing, the school board 
appoints a team of between seven and eleven management personnel. 
An equal number of employee representatives completes the 
committee. Each employee representative option that received at 
least 15 percent of the vote is entitled to proportional 
representation.85 The committee that conducted the election selects 
the representatives of the unaffiliated.86 The collaborative con- 
ferencing committee remains in effect for three years after which the 
81. 2011 Ind. Acts 575 §18.
82. Id. 
83. 2011 Tenn. Pub. Acts 378, § 49-5-605(b)(1).
84. Id. §§49-5-605(b)(1) & (2).
85. Id. § 49-5-605(b)(4).
86. Id. § 49-5-605(b)(5).
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election process is repeated.87 
The act defines collaborative conferencing as “the process by 
which [the parties] meet at reasonable times to confer, consult, and 
discuss and to exchange information, opinions and proposals on 
matters relating to the terms and conditions of professional employee 
service, using the principles and techniques of interest-based 
collaborative problem-solving.”88 The act prohibits refusing or failing 
to participate in collaborative conferencing.89 The Tennessee statute 
mandates collaborative conferencing with respect to salaries, 
grievance procedures, insurance, fringe benefits other than retirement 
benefits, working conditions, leave, and payroll deductions.90 It 
requires the parties to jointly prepare a written memorandum of 
understanding of any agreement reached but conditions portions of 
an agreement requiring funding on the appropriation of such funding 
by the relevant authority.91 
At first glance, the act appears to be an experiment in 
proportionate representation and constructive employee involvement 
in workplace decision-making. Closer scrutiny suggests that it may 
well be a sham for unilateral employer control. The statute expressly 
declares that the parties are not required to reach agreement and 
provides that if no agreement is reached, the school board sets 
employee terms and conditions of employment by board policy.92 The 
act also appears to expressly authorize the director of schools to 
bypass the employees’ representatives and deal directly with 
individual employees.93 Beyond these provisions, the act is silent as to 
the content of the duty to engage in collaborative conferencing. 
Because Tennessee does not have a labor relations board to 
administer the act, it presumably will be up to the Tennessee courts to 
determine the content of the duty and the extent to which the 
generally well-defined duty to bargain will be carried over to the duty 
to engage in collaborative conferencing. 
But perhaps good faith collaborative conferencing might lead to 
constructive employee involvement in other areas of workplace 
decision-making. Unfortunately, the Tennessee statute dashes such 
87. Id. § 49-5-605(b)(6)(A).
88.  Id. § 49-5-602(2).
89.  Id. §§ 49-5-606(a)(3) & (b)(2).
90.  Id. § 49-5-608(a).
91.  Id. § 49-5-609(b).
92.  Id. § 49-5-609(d).
93.  Id. § 49-5-608(c).
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hopes. It expressly prohibits collaborative conferencing with respect 
to differential pay plans and incentive compensation, expenditure of 
grants or awards, evaluations, staffing decisions, personnel decisions 
concerning assignment of professional employees, and payroll 
deductions for political activities.94 In so doing, it begs the question, if 
the statute does not mandate bargaining but instead mandates only 
interest-based problem solving, why prohibit the parties from talking 
about anything? The prohibition strongly suggests that the statute’s 
true purpose is to erect a sham that gives an illusion of collective 
representation without the reality. As in Indiana, to the extent that 
we see positive employee involvement in workplace decision-making, 
it will be in spite of rather than because of the new law. 
V. GLIMMERS OF REAL HOPE 
Tsunamis and other natural disasters generally provide glimmers 
of hope. People are found alive buried for days in the wreckage and 
go on to complete recoveries. The tsunami that hit public sector labor 
law may be no exception. In this part, I highlight a few glimmers of 
hope, alive beneath the wreckage, that may blossom into thinking 
outside the divide between mandatory traditional collective 
bargaining and unilateral employer control. 
The tsunami certainly left Michigan with a good deal of 
wreckage. As discussed above, Michigan greatly expanded its list of 
prohibited subjects of bargaining and provided for the abrogation of 
collective bargaining agreements by employers in fiscal distress. 
However, recently concluded bargaining between the state and a 
coalition of unions representing state employees offers an alternative 
approach that could blossom into true creative labor law reform. 
Personal involvement from Michigan Governor Rick Snyder and 
UAW President Bob King led to a major breakthrough in the 
impasse that the parties faced. The agreement includes a letter of 
understanding embracing a New Solutions report produced earlier in 
the year by the unions which recommended cost savings that included 
making government less top-heavy and spending less on contractors. 
The letter of understanding commits to “[l]ean practices [that] rely on 
joint participation between employees and management at all levels 
within the state. World class service cannot occur without such 
employee participation.” The contract calls for a New Solutions 
94.  Id. § 49-5-608(b).
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Committee – joint labor-management committee – to explore 
innovative solutions.95 Successful constructive employee voice at the 
state level could, perhaps, spread to local government and stimulate 
innovative efforts at labor law reform that break out from the divide 
between traditional adversarial bargaining and unilateral employer 
control.96 
Ohio presents another glimmer of hope. On November 8, 2011, 
the Ohio enactment was defeated by almost 62 percent of the 
electorate.97 In the aftermath of this crushing rejection of the Ohio 
legislature and Governor Kasich’s efforts to impose unilateral 
employer control, Governor Kasich has acknowledged the need to 
step back and reassess the approach to public sector labor relations.98 
Ohio embodies some very successful innovations in teacher 
representation that go beyond the traditional divide between 
mandatory subjects of bargaining and unilateral employer control. 
These include some very successful peer review programs.99 As the 
parties take a step back, perhaps they will focus on these successes 
and look beyond the mandatory subjects-complete employer control 
divide and consider creative approaches to labor law reform. 
Perhaps the picture painted in this Part is overly optimistic. 
Before we dismiss it as such, we should recognize that the tsunami has 
led to traditional adversaries rethinking approaches to collective 
representation of employees in workplace decision-making. For 
example, the American Federation of Teachers and the American 
Association of School administrators have partnered on a joint 
approach to teacher evaluation and improvement of teacher quality.100 
95. See Paul Egan, Snyder, King Meeting Helped Break Contract Impasse, DETROIT FREE
PRESS, Dec. 20, 2011, at A1, available at <http://www.freep.com/article/20111220/NEWS 
06/112200395/How Gov Rick Snyder UAW President Bob King broke impasse led way to new 
union deal?odyssey=tab|topnews|text|FRONTPAGE>. 
96. Unfortunately, this glimmer of hope may be fading. Following the 2012 election, the
lame duck Michigan legislature passed Right to Work legislation and Governor Snyder signed 
it, 2012 Mich. Pub. Acts 348, 349 (2012), severly straining his relatinshop with UAW President 
King, See Brent Snavely, UAW President Bob King Tried to Talk Snyder Out of Right-to-Work 
Push, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Dec. 6, 2012, at <http://www.freepress/article2012-1206/ 
News06/121206082). 
97. The official vote tally is available at State Issue 2: November 8, 2011, OHIO SEC’Y OF
STATE, <http://www.sos.state.oh.us/sos/elections/Research/electResultsMain/2011results/201108 
Issue2.aspx> (last viewed Dec. 3, 2012). 
98. See Joe Vardon, Kasich Moves on from Loss on Issue 2, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Nov.
16, 2011, at 3B. 
99. See Malin & Kerchner, supra note 5, at 904-06.
 100. AM. FED’N OF TEACHERS & AM. ASS’N OF SCH. ADM’RS, EDUCATOR QUALITY FOR 
THE 21ST CENTURY: A COLLABORATIVE EFFORT OF THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF 
SCHOOL ADMINISTRATORS AND THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TEACHERS (undated), 
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The AASA-AFT collaboration suggests that we may be seeing moves 
toward constructive leadership at the highest levels which could lead 
to creative public-sector labor law reform. 
School reform in Illinois provides an encouraging example of 
collaboration resulting in creative alternatives to traditional collective 
bargaining for providing for employee voice in workplace decision-
making.101 In January 2010, Illinois enacted the Performance 
Evaluation Reform Act (PERA).102 PERA requires school districts to 
incorporate in their teacher evaluation plans indicators of student 
growth as a significant factor in evaluating teacher performance. The 
decision as to how to do so must be made by a committee consisting 
of equal numbers of members appointed by the school district and the 
teachers and their union. PERA makes clear that the use of student 
growth in teacher evaluations is not a mandatory subject of 
bargaining. In place of traditional bargaining, PERA calls for a 
cooperative effort by school districts and their teachers but provides 
that if, after 180 days, the joint committee is unable to agree on a 
plan, the school district must adopt a default plan developed by the 
Illinois State Board of Education.103 
In 2011, a lengthy series of meetings led by the Chair of the State 
Senate Special Committee on Education Reform involving the major 
teacher unions, school board and school administrator associations, 
business, and community groups resulted in agreed-on reform 
legislation enacted by the state legislature and signed by the 
governor. The PERA model was used in part for reform of the 
process for laying off teachers during a reduction in force. Prior to the 
new act, state law required that untenured teachers be laid off first. 
When tenured teachers had to be laid off, state law required that they 
be selected in inverse order of seniority and that a teacher who lacked 
seniority to retain his or her position could bump a junior teacher 
from another position as long as he or she met the minimal state 
available at <http://www.aft.org/pdfs/teachers/AFTAASA062811.pdf> (last viewed Dec. 3, 
2012). 
 101.  For an excellent discussion of the process and the results, see Mitchell Roth, S.B. 7: A 
Union Perspective, ILL. PUB. EMP. REL. REP., Spring 2012, at 1; James Franczek & Amy 
Dickerson, Education Reform in Illinois: Making Performance Count, ILL. PUB. EMP. REL. 
REP., Winter 2012, at 1. 
 102.  Pub. Act No. 96-0861, 2009 Ill. Laws 8655, available at <http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/ 
publicacts/96/PDF/096-0861.pdf>. 
 103.  105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5-24A-4(b) (2010). PERA makes an exception for the Chicago 
Public Schools, allowing the Chicago School Board to implement its last best offer if the joint 
committee is unable to reach agreement. Id. 5-24A-4(c). 
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qualifications for that position.104 The new statute groups teachers into 
four categories based on their most recent performance evaluations. 
The first group to be laid off are non-tenured teachers with no 
evaluation as of the date of the layoff notices. They are selected for 
layoff first with the order within the group determined by the school 
district. Next are teachers with unsatisfactory or needs improvement 
ratings in one of their last two evaluations. They are laid off based on 
their performance ratings, with the lowest rated laid off first. The 
third group are teachers with satisfactory evaluations. If layoffs 
penetrate this group, they are conducted in inverse order of seniority. 
The final group is teachers who received ratings of excellent in their 
last two or two of their last three evaluations. Teachers in this group 
are laid off in inverse order of seniority.105 
The reform law follows the PERA model by requiring each 
school district to establish a joint labor-management committee. The 
committee may, by majority vote, provide for teachers who would 
otherwise be grouped in the second lowest performance classification 
to be moved into the next higher classification and may, by majority 
vote, modify the criteria for the highest performance grouping. 
Members of the committee also serve as watchdogs against school 
district manipulation of evaluations to lay off the most senior, and 
hence the most highly paid, teachers. If committee members in good 
faith believe that there is a pattern where senior faculty are receiving 
performance evaluations lower than their prior ones, they may 
receive and review relevant data from the district and issue a report 
to the district and the union.106 
The 2011, Illinois school reform law also addressed dismissal of 
tenured teachers and acquisition of tenure, provisions beyond the 
scope of this article.107 However, the approach of the reduction in 
force provisions, like the approach in PERA to incorporating student 
growth as an element in teacher evaluation plans, bears watching to 
see if it develops into a creative alternative to traditional collective 
bargaining for providing meaningful worker voice in workplace 
decision-making. The joint labor-management committee is designed 
 104.  See 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5-24-12(a) (Supp. 2011). 
 105.  Id. § 5/24-12(b). 
 106.  Id. § 5/24-12(c). 
107.  As indicated earlier, it also made length of the school year and length of the school day 
permissive subjects of bargaining for the Chicago Public Schools and modified the bargaining 
impasse resolution procedures, most notably restricting the right to strike in the Chicago Public 
Schools. 
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to work cooperatively on matters of common concern. If it does not 
reach agreement or consensus, the result is not a strike or an interest 
arbitration or an assertion of power through employer unilateral 
implementation followed by challenge to that power via union-filed 
unfair labor practice charges. Rather, the result is that the matter is 
governed by default rules established by the state. 
Proponents of the Illinois education reform law hailed the 
process that resulted in its enactment, contrasting it to the highly 
polarized partisan battles in Wisconsin and elsewhere.108 As notable as 
that process was, the 2011 reform act and PERA may, in the long run, 
be even more notable for developing a creative alternative to 
traditional collective bargaining for providing meaningful worker 
voice in workplace decision-making. If implementation yields positive 
result, the model may be examined for adaptation to other groups of 
public workers and to adoption in other states. 
VI. CONCLUSION
Conservative Republican victories in state elections in 2010 
powered a tsunami that hit public sector collective bargaining in 2011, 
leaving worker voice in its wreckage and a legacy of unilateral 
employer control in its wake. Although supporters of this upheaval 
argued that restoration of unilateral employer control was necessary 
to improve the functioning of public services, experience tells us that 
the approach is likely to fail. As Annie tells us in the play that bears 
her name, “The sun will come out tomorrow.” When it does, there 
are reasons to be optimistic that policy-makers may move away from 
the traditional dichotomy between mandatory subjects of collective 
bargaining and unilateral employer control and develop creative 
methods for worker voice that empower workers to contribute to the 
discourse on how best to serve the public. 
 108.  See Tara Malone, Education Reform Law is Signed and Lauded, CHI. TRIB., June 14, 
2011, at C5, available at <http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/chibrknews-
quinn-to-sign-education-overhaul-package-20110613,0,4441949.story>. 
